Citizenship, like friendship, is a fragile combination of opportunity, commitment, and constantly renewed regard. Without it, we are not fully human, not fully ourselves.
Friendship requires a leap, not of faith but of regard. We must trust to listen to the other whom we do not yet know, must rely on a basic willingness to care about someone who thinks and lives differently from ourselves. Montaigne’s instinctive philosophical skepticism made him wary of dogmatism and certainty, vividly aware that human interchanges are subtle and fraught with danger. But he is an expert conversationalist and, as such, knows the peculiar efforts and pleasures to be found in talking with another person. He is a loyal and devoted friend, and yet the times — we can never forget — are not friendly. Making friends is a lot harder, and a lot more important, than it sometimes seems.
For Montaigne, indeed, the lesson of any hard-won skepticism (or, more accurately, non-cognitivism — the inability to know the final truth) should never be anger or prejudice against others who think differently, but instead toleration of diversity. The reason is clear. Humans have the limitation that when it comes to knowledge, only the self can really be trusted. And yet the self is restricted in capacity. We must therefore be modest and open-minded, not judgmental and condemnatory: whereof we cannot know, we must not judge. His friendship with la Boetie taught him this valuable lesson about the relation between knowledge and kindness. It is true not because all human relationships could ever hope to be as elevated — Montaigne specifically denies this, singling out their friendship as unique (“Let no one put other, everyday friendships in the same rank as this”)* — but rather because such an unusual intimacy reminds us at once of our inescapable loneliness and fragile connections, person to person, that may sometimes transcend it. In Montaigne’s eyes, therefore, the highest expression of humanity is friendship, and the highest pupose of human society is therefore to make such friendship possible.
MARK KINGWELL, The World We Want: Virtue, Vice, and the Good Citizen
*Most associations between persons, he [Montaigne] notes, are actually pragmatic. “As familiar company at table, I choose the amusing rather than the wise; in bed I prefer beauty to goodness; and for serious conversation, I like ability even combined with dishonesty; and similarly in other things.” One person is loved “for his beauty, another for his ease of manner, another for his liberality, this one for his paternal affection, and that one for his brotherly love, and so on.” These ties are limited by circumstance and need. We do not care about the doctor’s religion, only his skill; the footman’s chastity is not at issue, just his duty; and the cook may swear as much as he likes, so long as he can make a souffle that rises well.
